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Digital signatures are widely used to provide security for electronic communications, for example, in
financial transactions and electronic mail. Currently used classical digital signature schemes, however, only
offer security relying on unproven computational assumptions. In contrast, quantum digital signatures offer
information-theoretic security based on laws of quantum mechanics. Here, security against forging relies
on the impossibility of perfectly distinguishing between nonorthogonal quantum states. A serious
drawback of previous quantum digital signature schemes is that they require long-term quantum memory,
making them impractical at present. We present the first realization of a scheme that does not need quantum
memory and which also uses only standard linear optical components and photodetectors. In our
realization, the recipients measure the distributed quantum signature states using a new type of quantum
measurement, quantum state elimination. This significantly advances quantum digital signatures as a
quantum technology with potential for real applications.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevLett.113.040502 PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Ac, 03.67.Hk, 42.50.Ex
Digital signatures are used to ensure that messages
cannot be forged or tampered with. Signed messages are
also transferable, meaning that it is unlikely that one
recipient accepts a message as genuine, while another
recipient, to whom the message is forwarded, rejects it.
This important property is also called nonrepudiation: a
sender cannot deny having sent a message. Digital sig-
nature schemes are different from encryption, which
guarantees the privacy of a message. Both are important
cryptographic tasks. Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1,2]
can be used to distribute a secret key for information-
theoretically secure encryption, and commercial systems
are already available [3,4]. Analogously, digital signature
schemes relying on quantum mechanics [5–8] can also be
made information-theoretically secure, in contrast to cur-
rently used classical digital signature schemes. In this
Letter we show that quantum digital signature (QDS)
and QKD require similar experimental components and
a comparable level of experimental complexity.
Protocols for quantum digital signatures have a distri-
bution stage and a messaging stage. We will describe the
case with one sender and two recipients, but this can be
extended to more recipients. In the distribution stage, the
sender, Alice, transmits quantum signature states to the
recipients, Bob and Charlie. She chooses a sequence of L
states for each possible message that she might later want to
send, for a suitable chosen integer L, and distributes one
copy of each state sequence to each recipient. The quantum
states are randomly chosen from a set of nonorthogonal
states; in our realization, we choose four coherent states jαi,
jαeiπ=2i, jαeiπi, and jαe3 iπ=2i, with known magnitude α.
The chosen phase sequences are analogous to a private key,
known only to Alice. In the simplest case, to send a one-bit
message later on, Alice distributes two sequences of states
to both Bob and Charlie, one corresponding to the possible
message 0, and one corresponding to the message 1.
In the subsequent messaging stage, Alice accompanies
the message she sends with the classical information about
the corresponding sequence of quantum states; in our
realization, this is the sequence of phases. A recipient of
a signed message tests that this agrees with the previously
distributed quantum signature states, and accepts the
message as genuine if there are sufficiently few mismatches
for the whole sequence. Similarly, to forward a message, a
recipient forwards the message together with the informa-
tion about the corresponding quantum signature states. The
new recipient again tests for mismatches and verifies that
these are below a desired threshold.
Previous QDS schemes [5–7] required that recipients
store the signature states in long-term quantum memory
until the messaging stage. Once a recipient is given the
private information about a signature state—say, that it
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should be equal to some state jϕi—the best way to test for a
mismatch is to make a quantum measurement with
measurement operators jϕihϕj, 1 − jϕihϕj(that is, to test
if the state has any component orthogonal to the state it is
declared to be).
The requirement for quantum memory is clearly infea-
sible at present. There may be days, weeks, or longer
between the distribution and the messaging stages, whereas
state-of-the-art quantum memories cannot achieve coher-
ence times longer than tens of minutes at room temperature
[9,10]. A protocol that circumvents quantum memory was
suggested in [8], and our current experiment realizes a
variant of this scheme. Here, the recipients measure the
signature states directly at the end of the distribution stage.
Only classical information needs to be stored. In [8],
unambiguous state discrimination measurements were
envisaged. In our realization, we improve on this idea so
that Bob and Charlie instead use “unambiguous quantum
state elimination” (USE) [11,12] to probabilistically
exclude one or more phase for each signature state.
Our experimental setup is shown in Fig. 1. The state
elimination measurement can for coherent states be realized
using linear optics and photodetectors. Each recipient uses
two detection systems, shown within dashed light blue lines
in the bottom right of Fig. 1, where the signature states are
interfered with reference pulses of phase 0 in the top and
phase π=2 in the bottom interferometer. Polarization rout-
ing [13] is employed for the orthogonally polarized signal
and reference pulses, using the polarizing beam combiner
and splitters. The reference pulses enter through the left-
hand input ports of beam splitters 2 and 3 while the delayed
signal pulses enter through the top. Detecting photons in
any of the output ports excludes one possible phase, similar
to a recent realization of unambiguous state discrimination
(USD) [14]. Whereas USD requires excluding all but one of
the quantum states, we only require elimination of at least
one state (phase). This significantly increases the number of
usable signature elements, by requiring fewer detection
coincidences. The process of USE is summarized here and
is described in more detail in the Supplemental Material
[15]. To estimate the resulting advantage, assume that
the amplitude entering Bob’s and Charlie’s measurement
setups is β and neglect, e.g., phase imperfections. The
probability of excluding the coherent state of opposite
phase to the one that is sent is then 1 − expð−jβj2Þ ¼ p, and
the probabilities of excluding the other two are 1−
expð−jβj2=2Þ ¼ q. The probability of excluding all three
states that were not sent is pq2, while the probability of
excluding at least one of them is 1 − ð1 − pÞð1 − qÞ2,
which is always greater. If, as in our experiment, jβj is
small, then this quantity is much greater than pq2.
A forger must avoid declaring a phase that has been
eliminated; more precisely, he must avoid this for suffi-
ciently many signature sequence positions. If Bob (or
Charlie) succeeds in eliminating three of the four possible
phases for one signature position, then a forger must select
FIG. 1 (color online). Experimental setup for distributing quantum digital signatures. VCSEL denotes a vertical cavity surface
emitting laser. Alice uses a LiNbO3 phase modulator to apply a phase shift Φ, randomly chosen as 0, π=2, π, or 3π=2, to each coherent
state. The recipients Bob and Charlie use an all-optical fiber multiport to ensure nonrepudiation and guard against forging, consisting of
the four beam splitters within the brown dashes in the center of the figure. For detection, the USE measurement setups within the light
blue dashes in the bottom right are used to eliminate one or more. For detection, the setups within the light blue dashes are used to
eliminate one or more possible phases. The detectors are silicon single-photon avalanche diodes (SPADs). PBC denotes a polarization
beam combiner and PBS denotes a polarization beam splitter.
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the single remaining phase to avoid a mismatch. But even if
just one phase is ruled out, a forger must avoid selecting
this phase. With USE, therefore, many events which would
count as nondetected if using USD will now contribute to
the detection of forging. Consequently, using state elimi-
nation leads to an improvement in the signature generation
rate. For both USE and USD, the forger’s probability of
avoiding too many mismatches decays exponentially with
the signature length L.
A more detailed security analysis is found in [8] and in
the Supplemental Material [15]. We have examined secu-
rity for a single use of the protocol, for general repudiation
attacks and all forging attacks except those involving
entangling operations on successive signature sequence
states. So-called “composable security” remains an impor-
tant issue. In short, security against forging follows since
Alice’s signature states are chosen from a set of non-
orthogonal quantum states, which cannot be distinguished
perfectly. Only Alice has the full description of these states.
Note that the number of recipients depends on protocol
parameters, because if too many copies of Alice’s signature
states are available, or if jαj2 is too large, then the private
phases could be determined reliably enough to forge a
message unless protocol parameters such as L are adjusted.
To prevent repudiation, recipients must ensure that they
are sufficiently unlikely to disagree on the validity of a
message. Here, as in [7], this is achieved using an all-
optical fiber multiport, shown in the center of Fig. 1 within
the dashed brown line. Bob and Charlie split the pulses
received from Alice using a 50∶50 beam splitter. Bob sends
to Charlie half of the pulse he received from Alice, and
Charlie does correspondingly. Bob then combines the com-
ponent he received directly fromAlicewith the component he
received from Charlie on another 50∶50 beam splitter, and
Charlie again does correspondingly. This symmetrizes
Bob’s and Charlie’s quantum states for each position in
the signature sequences, so that their measurement statistics
at the output of the multiport are identical. By choosing a
lower allowed fraction of mismatches sa for accepting a
message received directly from Alice, and a higher allowed
fraction sv for verifying that a forwarded message is
genuine, it can be made unlikely that two recipients will
disagree on the validity of a message, see [5,8] and [15].
Moreover, the multiport guarantees that even if Alice
uses general, possibly entangled, quantum states, she still
cannot make Bob and Charlie significantly disagree on the
validity of a signature. In addition, by considering counts at
the multiport null ports, the recipients can guard against
certain types of forging.
In [8] and in the Supplemental Material [15] we show
that the probabilities for repudiation and forging decay
exponentially in L, by suitable choice of protocol param-
eters depending on the properties of an actual implemen-
tation. The scheme can also be made robust; that is, if all
parties are honest, then the protocol runs as intended with
high probability. In any implementation, errors will occur
even if all parties are honest. Therefore, to ensure robust-
ness, one should for example select sa > 0.
Defining the level of security in QDS is not straightfor-
ward, since different parties may be honest and dishonest.
Here we assume that one chooses values of sa and sv such
that the probabilities for repudiation, forging, and rejection
if all participants are honest are all equal (see [15]). The
probability of any of these undesirable events occurring is
then
P ðfailureÞ ≤ exp½−ðg2=8ÞL; ð1Þ
where g is the gap giving a lower bound on the advantage
that someone (e.g., Alice) has if she knows the signature,
compared to someone else (e.g., a forger) who makes a guess
by performing a measurement on the signature copies (see
[15]). In this Letter, we will call the failure probability the
“security level of the QDS scheme.” Equation (1) shows that
a greater gap g gives better protocol performance.
The figure of merit that we will use to quantify the
performance of our experiment is the length of the signature
L required to sign a “half-bit” message for a given security
level. One can also define the rate of the signature as the
number of bits per second that can be signed securely, given
the clock rate of the source used. Our experiment uses a
clock rate of 100 MHz, due to the temporal response profile
of the Geiger-mode silicon single-photon avalanche diodes
(Si-SPADs) [16].
We explored mean photon numbers per pulse
from jαj2 ¼ 1 to 11. Coherent states are generated by a
temperature-stabilized pulsed VCSEL with wavelength
850.17 nm, attenuated to the desired mean photon number
per pulse jαj2, defined at the launch from Alice into the
multiport. For a given run of the experiment with some jαj2,
we registered the phases that Bob and Charlie ruled out.
These experimental data give the probabilities of exclud-
ing particular states, given that Alice sent a certain state. All
losses are included, because these probabilities are deter-
mined from the experimentally measured ratio of detection
events to the total number of pulses sent by Alice. For the
QDS scheme to be secure, an honest participant must be
able to detect a difference between forged and genuine
signatures (see [15]). How large this difference is deter-
mines g (see [15,17]), and therefore, through Eq. (1),
determines the length L required for a desired security
level. The gap g is proportional to the transmittance (one
minus the losses) [15]; therefore, the length L for a fixed
security level decreases quadratically as the transmittance
increases. In short, the difference between the success and
failure probabilities for USE determines how well a
participant can identify a false declaration.
Experimental results are shown in Fig. 2. Each data point
represents the mean of several measurements. Vertical error
bars are the standard deviation, and horizontal error bars the
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uncertainty in the mean photon number due to a pulse-
to-pulse variation of < 1.5% in VCSEL intensity. In
Fig. 2(b) USE success means that at least one state was
eliminated, as long as the state that Alice actually sent was
not eliminated. USE failure means that the state that Alice
actually sent was eliminated. The success probability for
USD is also shown, and is considerably lower than for
USE. With USE, one sometimes excludes more than one
state. All USD success events are included in the USE
success data. As already noted, with USE many events
which would count as undetected in USD will now
contribute to the detection of forging, in addition to all
USD success events. The difference between the success
and failure probabilities is greater for USE than it is for
USD, similarly indicating that USE leads to a greater
chance of detecting forging.
For all investigated values of jαj2, the success probability
for USE is much higher than the failure rate. For higher
failure rates, one has to set acceptance and verification
thresholds sa and sv higher to ensure robustness. This in
turn increases the signature length required to ensure the
same security level. The primary cause of a failure, for both
USE and USD, was the fringe visibility of the detection
setups, which was 80.9%. The multiport has a fringe
visibility of 99.7%.
When determining the optimal jαj2, one has to consider
that the gap also depends on pmin, which is the minimum
error probability that a forger obtains if he tries to guess
Alice’s signature by measuring a copy of the quantum
signature [15]. For very small α, pmin is large, but detecting
a false declaration is difficult, while for very large α, pmin is
small but detecting a false declaration is relatively easy.
Since the ability to detect a false declaration is estimated from
experimental data, and does not have an analytical expres-
sion, it is not straightforward to determine the optimum α. In
our experiment, the best gap g ¼ 1.20 × 10−6 occurs for
jαj2 ¼ 1. For a security level of 0.01% this gives L ¼
5.10 × 1013 to sign a half bit. This is an impractical signature
length, and below we will comment on planned improve-
ments in order to make this rate more practical.
The signature length L increases with increased distance
between parties, since g in Eq. (1) is proportional to the
transmittance η. For example, if η is squared, then the L
required for the same level of security will increase by a
factor of η−2. In any event, if honest recipients see a
difference between a forged and a genuine signature,
however small, then it is always possible to find values
of sa, sv, and L to give a desired level of security.
To conclude, we have experimentally demonstrated a
first realization of a QDS scheme which does not require
long-term quantum memory, and where the recipients use
quantum state elimination. This is an important step in
developing practical QDS systems. Our experiment uses
phase-encoded coherent states. Recently, Arrazola and
(b)(a)
FIG. 2 (color online). (a) Experimentally measured time-gated detector events for Charlie. The time-gated signal count rate is the
detector click rate summed over all four of Charlie’s signal SPADs, filtered by a window of1 ns around the expected pulse arrival time.
The “loss corrected gated rate” is the calculated time-gated count rate at the signal output of the multiport. (b) Rates of successful and
failed measurements for one recipient. “USE success” means that at least one state was correctly excluded using quantum state
elimination. That is, the state Alice actually sent was not excluded, and at least one other state was excluded. “USE failure” means that
the state Alice actually sent was excluded. “USD success” is the rate of successful unambiguous state discrimination (the correct state
was obtained) while “USD failure” is the rate of unsuccessful unambiguous state discrimination (the obtained state differs from that sent
by Alice). Data points represent experimental results and dashed lines are theoretical predictions [18]. Experimental data are averaged
over several measurements and error bars in the count rate are the standard deviation. Horizontal error bars for the mean photon number
are dominated by a worst-case assumption that the pulse-to-pulse variation in the output power of our laser is the experimentally
measured maximum of 1.5%.
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Lütkenhaus suggested using phase-encoded coherent states
for quantum fingerprinting [19]. In our demonstration, due
to the difficulty of stabilizing a multiport with long optical
paths, the sender and receivers were only separated from
each other by approximately five meters of optical fiber.
Separate reference signals are needed for calibration before
signature transmission, and as phase reference for the USE
measurements. Tampering with reference pulses by a malevo-
lent party should not lead to higher probability of forging or
repudiation than tampering with signal states themselves
[15]. Also, reference signals can be bright, and thus can in
principle be fully monitored through quantum tomography.
We are currently exploring three changes to significantly
improve performance. First, by extrapolating data from a
recent experiment on USE, we expect the optimal jαj2 to be
around 0.5. Because of the high losses of this early prototype
we were unable to successfully resolve measurements at
this jαj2. The second improvement is to use a protocol that
does not require a multiport, in order to decrease loss.
Nonrepudiation then needs to be guaranteed in an alternative
way, similar to our recently proposed alternative QDS
schemes [20], which could be modified to use phase-
encoded coherent states, similar to the current realization.
We estimate that implementing these changes will result in a
gap of g ¼ 1.96 × 10−4, and length L ¼ 1.19 × 109 for a
security level of 0.01%. This protocol also potentially offers
increased distances between sender and receivers.
Finally, increasing the clock rate, and therefore the
transmission rate, is possible. The phase modulators,
VCSEL, and driving electronics are capable of clock rates
up to 3.3 GHz. In the system described in this Letter we did
not employ such clock rates due to the limitations of the
time-stamping electronics [21].
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